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Abstract
We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal
and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the
agent can exert unobservable eort, leading to success or failure. Incentives
provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the rst period,
so that the eort level induced in the second period is higher after a rst-
period success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the
principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be too
good to be nanced or, similarly, an agent can be overqualied.
JEL classication: D86, C73
Keywords: Dynamic moral hazard; hidden actions; limited liability.
∗
An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title Repeated moral hazard, limited
liability, and renegotiation. We would like to thank Patrick Bolton, Bo Chen, Mathias Dewa-
tripont, Oliver Gürtler, Thomas Mariotti, Tymoy Mylovanov, Andreas Roider, Urs Schweizer,
and Jean Tirole for very helpful discussions. Moreover, we are very grateful to two anonymous
referees and the editor, Jan Eeckhout, for making valuable comments and suggestions. Financial
support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB/TR15, is gratefully acknowledged.
†
University of Bonn, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Adenauerallee 2442, 53113 Bonn, Ger-
many. E-mail: susanne.ohlendorf@uni-bonn.de
‡
University of Cologne, Department of Economics, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Ger-
many, and CEPR, London, UK. E-mail: patrick.schmitz@uni-koeln.de
1
1 Introduction
This paper oers a new perspective on dynamic moral hazard problems. Consider
a risk-neutral principal, who can hire a risk-neutral but wealth-constrained agent.
The agent can exert unobservable eort, which increases the likelihood of success.
In the one-shot problem, there is a well-known trade-o between eort incentives
and rent extraction, which leads to a downward distorted eort level compared to
the rst-best solution. We extend the standard model by assuming that there is
a second period, in which the principal can make an investment to continue the
project and the agent can again exert unobservable eort. It turns out that there
are several interesting insights that so far have escaped the literature on repeated
moral hazard, which was focused on the case of risk-averse agents.
In particular, if the principal can commit not to renegotiate, the second period
incentives can be used to partially circumvent the limited liability constraint. In the
second period, the principal induces the agent to choose a particularly high eort
level following a rst-period success and a particularly low eort level following a
rst-period failure. The prospect of a higher second-period rent following a rst-
period success motivates the agent to exert more eort in the rst period; i.e., rents
in the second period act as reward and punishment for the rst period. It should
be emphasized that we assume no technological impact of a rst-period success or
failure on the second-period technology. Nevertheless, an optimal dynamic contract
exhibits memory. Hence, if an outsider observed today a principal-agent pair that
was successful and another identical pair that was not successful, he would be right
to predict that the rst pair also is more likely to succeed tomorrow. In other
words, a serial correlation across periods, which we sometimes refer to as a hot
hand eect, is generated endogenously, merely based on incentive considerations.
1
Just as in the one-shot model, eort levels are distorted and not every project
that would be installed in a rst-best world will be pursued under moral hazard. It
1
The term having a hot hand originated in basketball and means having a streak of successes
that cannot be attributed to normal variation in performance. It seems to spectators that the
probability of a success increases after a row of successes, even though the trials in question are
independent; see Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985).
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also is still the case that the principal will always prefer a project (or, equivalently,
an agent) that yields a larger return in case of success (among otherwise identical
projects or agents). Somewhat surprisingly, however, the latter observation is no
longer true if renegotiation cannot be ruled out.
The hot hand eect implies that a principal would sometimes like to commit
to terminate a project following a rst-period failure, even though technologically
the success probability of the second period is not aected by the rst-period
outcome. Yet, the threat to terminate may not be credible if renegotiation cannot
be prevented. In this case, a new kind of ineciency occurs, that to the best of
our knowledge has not been identied in the repeated moral hazard literature so
far: The principal might deliberately choose a project that is commonly known to
yield smaller potential returns than another (otherwise identical) project that is
also available. Similarly, she might deliberately hire an agent that is commonly
known to be less qualied.
The reason that a project might be too good to be funded or an agent might
be overqualied is the fact that the principal cannot resist the temptation to
renegotiate if the potential return is too attractive, which is anticipated by the
agent, whose incentives to work hard in the rst period are dulled. In contrast, a
less qualied agent or an agent working on a less attractive project may well be
willing to exert more eort in the rst period, because he knows that in case of a
failure he will not get a second chance. Since the credible threat to terminate the
project after a rst-period failure improves rst-period incentives, there are indeed
parameter constellations under which a relatively bad project is funded, while a
better project is not.
The literature on repeated moral hazard problems and renegotiation has dier-
ent strands. Most papers consider repeated versions of the traditional moral hazard
setting, where the agent is risk-averse and there is a trade-o between insurance
and incentives.
2
In a pioneering paper, Rogerson (1985) considered a two-period
moral hazard problem and showed that the optimal second-period incentives de-
pend on the rst-period outcome (i.e., the contract exhibits memory), even though
2
For comprehensive surveys, see Chiappori, Macho, Rey, and Salanié (1994) and Bolton and
Dewatripont (2005, ch. 10).
3
the periods are technologically independent. However, his result is driven by the
consumption-smoothing motive of the risk-averse agent,
3
which is absent in our
setting.
In moral hazard models with a risk-averse agent, renegotiation is an issue even
in the one-shot problem, because after the agent has chosen an eort level, there
is no need to expose him to further risk. Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), Ma (1991,
1994) and Matthews (1995, 2001) show that it depends on the details of the rene-
gotiation game (specically, who makes the renegotiation oer) whether or not
eort incentives are reduced.
4
In contrast, in our framework there is scope for
renegotiation only if the moral hazard problem is repeated, and the details of the
renegotiation game are irrelevant for our results.
Although we consider a repeated moral hazard problem, it is interesting to
note that our results are also related to the repeated adverse selection literature.
5
Specically, in a seminal paper Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) consider a two-
period model where the agent has private information about the quality of a project
that he submits for funding. Ex ante, the principal would like to terminate bad
projects after the rst period in order to deter the agent from submitting them
(hard budget constraint). Yet, at the beginning of the second period she is
tempted to renance them (soft budget constraint). The absence of commitment
power thus enables bad projects to be funded. However, as has been pointed out
by Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003, p. 1110), the principal would not nance a
bad project if she knew the quality ex ante. In contrast, in our model a bad project
may be funded, while a better project may not be funded, even though the quality
is common knowledge.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in repeated moral hazard mod-
3
Cf. Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988), Fudenberg, Holmström, and Milgrom (1990), and Rey
and Salanié (1990).
4
See also Hermalin and Katz (1991) and Dewatripont, Legros, and Matthews (2003), who
consider observable but unveriable eort.
5
The fact that the one-shot moral hazard model with a risk-neutral but wealth-constrained
agent has some similarities to the one-shot adverse selection model has already been noted by
Laont and Martimort (2002, p. 147).
4
els with limited liability to study long-term lender-borrower relationships. Contem-
poraneous work in this area includes Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), De Marzo
and Fishman (2007a, 2007b), and Biais, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2010).
6
These articles are concerned with the long-run dynamics of rm size and survival
rates. It is analyzed how an entrepreneur is best induced to avoid large risks or
to reveal private information about the cash ow, and whether the optimal invest-
ment and growth pattern can be implemented with standard nancial contracts.
For reasons of tractability, these complex dynamic models usually assume that
the incentive problem of the entrepreneur/rm is a binary choice. In contrast, we
study a simple model with only two periods but characterize the optimal sequence
of eort levels when eort levels can be adjusted continuously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we intro-
duce the one-shot moral hazard problem with a risk-neutral but wealth-constrained
agent, which now is sometimes called eciency wage model.
7
This model serves
as a benchmark for the dynamic analysis. We then introduce the two-period model
in Section 2.2.
8
In Section 3, we analyze the commitment scenario. In Section 4,
it is assumed that renegotiation cannot be ruled out, which may lead to the too
good to be nanced (or overqualication) eect. Finally, concluding remarks
follow in Section 5. All proofs have been relegated to the appendix.
6
See also Fong and Li (2009) for a related analysis of relational contracts in an employment
context.
7
See Tirole (1999, p. 745) or Laont andMartimort (2002, p. 174). Moreover, cf. the traditional
eciency wage literature (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) and the literature on deferred compensation
(Lazear, 1981; Akerlof and Katz, 1989), which are related but have a dierent focus. In related
frameworks, Strausz (2006) studies auditing and Lewis and Sappington (2000) explore the role of
private information about limited wealth.
8
Dynamic models with risk-neutral agents, hidden actions, and wealth constraints include
also Crémer (1995), Baliga and Sjöström (1998), Che and Yoo (2001), and Schmitz (2005). Yet,
they rely on features (private information about productivity, observable yet unveriable eort,
common shocks, and technological relations between the periods, respectively) which are absent
in the repeated (pure) moral hazard problem studied here. See also the unknown-quality model
of Hirao (1993) and the binary-eort model of Bierbaum (2002), who compare short-term and
long-term contracts. In related settings, Winter (2006) and Tamada and Tsai (2007) analyze
sequential agency problems.
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2 The model
2.1 The one-shot contracting problem
As a useful benchmark, let us rst take a brief look at the one-shot moral-hazard
problem that will be repeated twice in our full-edged model. There are two
parties, a principal and an agent, both of whom are risk-neutral. The agent has
no resources of his own, so that all payments to the agent have to be nonnegative.
The parties' reservation utilities are assumed to be zero. At some initial date 0,
the principal can decide whether or not to pursue a project. If she installs the
project, she oers a contract to the agent. Having accepted the contract, the agent
exerts unobservable eort e ∈ [0, 1] at date 1. His disutility from exerting eort is
given by c(e). Finally, at date 2, either a success (y = 1) or a failure (y = 0) is
realized, where the probability of success is normalized to equal the eort level, i.e.
Pr{y = 1|e} = e. The principal's veriable return is given by yR.
Assumption 1. The eort cost function satises
a) c′ ≥ 0, c′′ ≥ 0, c′′′ ≥ 0, and c′′(e) > 0 for all e > 0,
b) c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, and c′(1) ≥ R.
The rst-best eort level eFB maximizes the expected total surplus
S(e) := eR − c(e) (1)
and is thus characterized by
S ′(eFB) = R− c′(eFB) = 0. (2)
The principal could attain the rst-best eort level, but in order to do so she
would have to leave all of her returns to the agent. Hence, the principal faces
a trade-o between increasing the pie and getting a larger share for herself. In
the second-best solution, the principal will not pay anything when no revenue is
generated.
9
If t denotes the principal's transfer payment to the agent in case of
9
This is a standard result. See e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Section 4.1.2) for a
simple textbook exposition of the one-shot moral hazard model with risk-neutrality and resource
constraints. See also Innes (1990), Pitchford (1998), or Tirole (2001) for variants of this model.
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success, the agent's expected payo from exerting eort e is et − c(e). If t ≤ R,
which will hold in the principal's optimal contract,
10
the agent's maximization
problem has an interior solution characterized by t = c′(e). Because of this one-
to-one relationship between transfers set by the principal and the resulting eort
levels, we can proceed as if the principal could directly set the eort level, and write
the principal's problem in terms of eort levels. The principal thus maximizes her
expected prot
P (e) := e(R− c′(e)), (3)
hence the rst-order condition that characterizes the second-best eort level eSB is
P ′(eSB) = R− c′(eSB)− eSBc′′(eSB) = 0. (4)
Our assumptions on the cost function guarantee that the function P is concave.
We also dene
A(e) := ec′(e)− c(e), (5)
the agent's rent from a contract that leads him to choose eort e. By calculat-
ing the derivative A′(e) = ec′′(e) we see that A is a strictly increasing, convex,
and nonnegative function. Hence, a higher implemented eort level yields higher
rents for the agent. In order to reduce the agent's rent, the principal introduces a
downward distortion of the induced eort level, eSB < eFB.
In the one-shot problem, the principal is willing to install the project whenever
the installment cost is lower than P (eSB), which is smaller than S(eFB); i.e., not
all projects that would be pursued in a rst-best world will actually be installed.
However, given the choice between two (otherwise identical) projects with possible
returns Rg and Rb < Rg, the principal will never prefer the bad project that can
yield Rb only.
2.2 The two-period model
Now we turn to the full-edged two-period model. For simplicity, we neglect dis-
counting. At date 0, the principal decides whether or not to install the project. To
10
Note that oering a payment t larger than R would violate the principal's participation
constraint.
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Figure 1: The sequence of events.
simplify the exposition, we assume that there are no installment costs at this date.
11
The principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract oer to the agent. Having ac-
cepted the oer, at date 1 the agent chooses an unobservable rst-period eort level
e1 ∈ [0, 1], incurring disutility c(e1). At date 2, the veriable rst-period return y1R
is realized, where y1 ∈ {0, 1} denotes failure or success, and Pr{y1 = 1|e1} = e1.
The project may then be terminated (x(y1) = 0) or continued (x(y1) = 1), which is
veriable.
12
In order to continue the project, the principal must invest an amount
I2 ≤ S(e
FB). In this case, at date 3 the agent chooses an unobservable second-
period eort level e2(y1) ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, at date 4 the veriable second-period
return y2R is realized, where y2 ∈ {0, 1} and Pr{y2 = 1|e2(y1)} = e2(y1). Note that
the two periods are independent; in particular, we do not assume any technological
spillovers that would make a second-period success more likely after a rst-period
success. The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1.
The rst-best benchmark solution. Assume for a moment that eort were
veriable. The principal would then continue the project regardless of the rst-
period outcome (x(0) = x(1) = 1), and she would implement the eort levels
11
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this simplication. It is straightforward to
extend the model to the case in which the principal incurs costs I1 > 0 when she installs the
project.
12
We assume that it is too costly for the principal to replace the agent at date 2, because at
that point in time the parties are locked-in (i.e., the relationship has undergone Williamson's
(1985) fundamental transformation). For instance, hiring a new agent for the ongoing project
might require specic training, which makes replacement unprotable. See Spear and Wang
(2005), Mylovanov and Schmitz (2008), and Kräkel and Schöttner (2010) for models in which
replacement involves no costs. Our model could be extended to the case of costly replacement,
but this would make the exposition less tractable without yielding additional economic insights.
8
e1 = e2(0) = e2(1) = e
FB
with a straightforward forcing contract, leaving no rent
to the agent.
Contracts when eort is unobservable. In the remainder of the paper, we
assume again that eort levels are unobservable. We do not impose any ad hoc
restrictions on the class of feasible contracts; i.e., there is complete contracting in
the sense of Tirole (1999).
A contract species a continuation decision (which may be conditioned on the
rst period outcome) and transfer payments from the principal to the agent (which
may be conditioned on the continuation decision and the rst and second period
outcomes). The transfer payments have to satisfy the limited liability constraint of
the agent. The principal can also include recommended eort levels in the contract.
The contractual terms must be such that it is in the agent's own self-interest to
obey the recommendations (cf. Myerson, 1982); i.e., the recommendations must
satisfy suitable incentive compatibility constraints.
Thus, a contract species for the possible rst-period outcomes y1 ∈ {0, 1} the
probability of continuation x(y1), the rst-period transfer payments t1(y1) to be
made at date 2, and the second-period transfer payments t2(y1, y2) to be made at
date 4 in case of continuation.
13
The limited liability constraints are given by
t1(y1) ≥ 0 (6)
for the rst period and by
t2(y1, y2) ≥ 0 (7)
for the second period. Note that the latter condition presupposes that the agent
cannot be forced to pay back payments that he received in the past.
14
Finally,
13
While it may well be optimal to randomize between continuation and termination, other kinds
of randomization cannot occur. Stochastic transfer payments can always be replaced by their
expected value, because both principal and agent are risk-neutral. This also includes transfer
payments that depend on the randomization device that pins down the continuation decision.
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that an optimal contract will never induce randomization
over eort levels.
14
Otherwise, the limited liability constraint would read t2(y1, y2) ≥ −t1(y1). It turns out that
our results would not change if we relaxed the limited liability constraint in this way. In fact, it
would be without loss of generality to assume that all payments are made at date 4 only.
9
the contract species recommended eort levels e1, e2(0), and e2(1). The incentive
compatibility constraints for the second period are
e2(y1) ∈ arg max
e∈[0,1]
et2(y1, 1) + (1− e)t2(y1, 0)− c(e). (8)
We denote the continuation payo of the agent once the rst period outcome is
realized by
a(y1) = t1(y1) + x(y1)
[
e2(y1)t2(y1, 1) + (1− e2(y1))t2(y1, 0)− c(e2(y1))
]
. (9)
The rst-period incentive compatibility constraint is then given by
e1 ∈ arg max
e∈[0,1]
ea(1) + (1− e)a(0)− c(e). (10)
We now show that the class of contracts that we need to consider can be simpli-
ed. In particular, we show that because only the dierence between t2(y2, 1) and
t2(y2, 0) matters for the agent's eort choice in the second period, contracts that
reward a failure in the second period (t2(y1, 0) > 0) can be replaced by contracts
that specify suitably larger payments at date 2. For any given transfer scheme
(t1, t2) we dene
t˜1(y1) = t1(y1) + t2(y1, 0)x(y1),
t˜2(y1, 0) = 0, and
t˜2(y1, 1) = max{t2(y1, 1)− t2(y1, 0), 0}.
It is straightforward to check that the payments (t˜1, t˜2) induce the same second
period eort levels as (t1, t2), the same continuation payos a(1) and a(0), and
therefore also the same rst period eort levels. Moreover, they fulll the limited
liability requirements, and they lead to the same expected payos.
15
It is thus
without loss of generality to restrict attention to a set C of contracts for the princi-
pal's optimization problem, where elements κ ∈ C are given by κ = (t1, t2, x, e1, e2)
with
• x : {0, 1} → [0, 1],
15
Note that a contract that satises only the weaker limited liability constraint t2(y1, y2) ≥
−t1(y1) can be replaced by the scheme (t˜1, t˜2) that consists of nonnegative payments only.
10
• t1 : {0, 1} → R≥0, t2 : {0, 1}
2 → R≥0, t2(y1, 0) = 0,
• e2 : {0, 1} → [0, 1] with e2(y1) ∈ argmaxe∈[0,1] et2(y1, 1)− c(e), and
• e1 ∈ argmaxe∈[0,1] ea(1) + (1− e)a(0)− c(e).
Since the agent can always choose not to exert any eort at all, the limited liability
constraint together with the incentive compatibility constraint ensures participa-
tion. Hence, all contracts in the set C satisfy the incentive compatibility and
limited liability constraints and are accepted by the agent. If the principal oers a
contract κ = (t1, t2, x, e1, e2) ∈ C, her expected prot is given by
Π(κ) = e1
(
R− t1(1) + x(1)
[
e2(1)(R− t2(1, 1))−I2
])
(11)
+(1− e1)
(
−t1(0) + x(0)
[
e2(0)(R− t2(0, 1))−I2
])
.
In the solution of the optimization problem it will turn out that t1(0) = 0; i.e., an
agent will never be rewarded for a failure. A rst-period success may be directly
rewarded with a bonus payment t1(1), while a second-period success may be re-
warded with a bonus t2(0, 1) (following a rst-period failure) or t2(1, 1) (following
a rst-period success). As we will see, a rst-period success will also be indirectly
rewarded by the prospect of getting a larger bonus for a second-period success if it
follows a rst-period success, which will be a driving force behind our main results.
3 The full commitment case
In this section, we assume that the principal can commit not to renegotiate the
contract that is written at date 0. In order to solve the full-edged two-period model
we rst solve the one-period problem of nding the optimal continuation contract
that leaves the agent with a certain payo. While also being of independent interest,
this result is then used to nd the optimal continuation payos in the two-period
problem. We denote by pi(a) the principal's maximum continuation payo when
she implements the expected second-period payo a of the agent. Recall that the
principal can implement any second-period eort level e2 by setting t2(y1, 1) =
c′(e2), sharing the second-period surplus S(e2)− I2 such that the agent gets A(e2)
11
and the principal gets P (e2)− I2. In order to characterize the function pi, we have
to nd the continuation contract (t1, x, t2, e2) with t2 = c
′(e2) that maximizes the
principal's payo among those that implement a given expected payo a of the
agent. Before we can state the result, we need the following lemma and denition:
Lemma 1. If I2 > 0, then there is a unique eort level e¯ > 0 with
S(e¯)− I2 =
S ′(e¯)
A′(e¯)
A(e¯). (12)
If we dene e¯ = 0 in case I2 = 0, then the cut-o level e¯ is a continuous and
increasing function of I2, with e¯ = e
SB
at I2 = P (e
SB) and e¯ = eFB at I2 = S(e
FB).
Proof. See the appendix.
Because the right hand side of (12) is nonnegative, the net present value of a
project with eort level e¯ is also never negative. The so dened eort level e¯ plays
a role in implementing relatively low payos of the agent.
Lemma 2. The following table shows the continuation contract that optimally im-
plements a given continuation payo a of the agent, and the resulting continuation
payo pi(a) of the principal:
t1 e2 x pi(a)
if 0 ≤ a ≤ A(e¯) 0 e¯ a
A(e¯)
x(P (e¯)− I2)
if A(e¯) < a < A(eFB) 0 A−1(a) 1 P (e2)− I2
if A(eFB) ≤ a a− A(eFB) eFB 1 S(eFB)− I2 − a
The function pi(a) is concave and has the derivative pi′(a) = P
′(e2)
A′(e2)
.
Proof. See the appendix.
It becomes clear from the lemma that only projects with positive net present
value and eort level equal to or greater than e¯ will be implemented. Moreover,
we see that as the agent's payo a increases, the expected total surplus induced by
the principal's optimal continuation contract weakly rises.
12
If the agent's payo a is larger than A(eFB) = S(eFB), then the principal will
implement e2 = e
FB
and transfer the residuum a−A(eFB) to the agent by making a
positive payment t1. Otherwise, there will be no such payment, since implementing
a project with positive net present value is a better method to reward the agent
than a direct transfer.
To see why a positive probability of termination is sometimes optimal for the
principal, consider the case that I2 is lower than P (e
SB), so that there exist eort
levels that lead to a positive continuation payo, while the required payo a is so low
that a project with eort level e2 = A
−1(a) would lead to a negative continuation
payo P (e2) − I2 < 0. In such a case, it is more protable for the principal to
implement a higher eort level with a positive payo for herself and achieve the
required a by adjusting the continuation probability x. The eort level e¯ is the
result of a trade-o between a larger continuation payo P (e)−I2 (which increases
with e up to eSB) and a lower probability of achieving this payo (x = a
A(e)
decreases
with e).
There is another case in which a positive probability of termination is optimal:
Assume that I2 is larger than P (e
SB), so that the principal's continuation payo
is negative for all eort levels, and a is so low that a project with eort level
e2 = A
−1(a) would have a negative net present value. It is then more protable
for the principal to implement a higher eort level and scale the project down to
achieve the required continuation payo a. In this case, the implemented eort
level e¯ is larger than eSB.
The following proposition characterizes the second-best solution of the two-
period model under full commitment.
Proposition 1. Assume that the principal can commit not to renegotiate. In
the principal's optimal contract, the project is either always continued with some
probability and the induced eort levels satisfy
eFB ≥ eC2 (1) > e
C
1 > e
SB > eC2 (0) > 0,
or the project is terminated after a failure and the eort levels satisfy
eFB ≥ eT2 (1) > e
T
1 ≥ e
SB.
13
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition establishes the hot hand eect. Even though a success in the
rst period has no technological eect whatsoever on the likelihood of a success
in the second period, the principal implements eC2 (1) > e
SB > eC2 (0). Giving
the agent in the second period particularly high incentives following a rst-period
success (and particularly low incentives following a failure) has desirable spillover
eects on the rst-period incentives: The agent works hard in the rst period not
only in order to get the direct reward t1(1), but also in order to enjoy a higher
second-period rent. In fact, the direct rst-period reward t1(1) will be positive
only if the principal already induces eC2 (1) = e
FB
, so that implementing an even
higher eort level following a rst-period success would reduce the total surplus.
Since giving the agent incentives in the rst period is now cheaper than in the
one-shot problem, the principal implements e1 > e
SB
.
In the next proposition, we explore the dependence of the optimal continuation
decisions on the installment cost.
Proposition 2. There exist cut-o levels IC ,IT , and ITT , where
0 < IC ≤ IT < P (eSB) < ITT ≤ S(eFB),
such that
a) if I2 ≤ I
C
, then the project is always continued, x(1) = x(0) = 1.
b) if IT ≥ I2 > I
C
, then x(1) = 1 while x(0) < 1, i.e., the optimal contract leads
with positive probability to termination after a failure.
c) if I2 > I
T
, then the project is terminated whenever the rst period was a failure,
x(0) = 0, and it is continued with x(1) = 1 after a success for I2 ≤ I
TT
, and with
some probability x(1) ∈ (0, 1) for I2 > I
TT
.
Proof. See the appendix.
While for low installment costs it is always benecial for the principal to con-
tinue the project unconditionally, continuing the project after a rst-period failure
might not be in the principal's interest when her continuation costs I2 are su-
ciently large. Clearly, if I2 is so large that P (e
C
2 (0)) < I2, the principal is worse
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o if she continues the project. Even if this inequality does not hold, it can still
be optimal for the principal to commit to terminate the project at least with some
probability, because doing so improves the agent's rst-period incentives. As I2
becomes large, it may also become optimal to terminate the project with a positive
probability after a rst-period success. To see why such a randomized decision
x(1) < 1 may be benecial for the principal, consider the case that I2 is close to
S(eFB). Since the principal never installs a project with negative net present value,
she will implement a very large eort level e2(1) close to e
FB
. To implement such a
large eort level she has to leave almost all of the second-period return to the agent
while she bears the installment costs I2. She will therefore scale the project down
except in the case that the eect of the agent's large continuation payo on the
rst-period eort level osets the cost of setting x(1) = 1. This case occurs in the
following example of a quadratic cost function, which shows that randomization
does not have to occur in an optimal contract.
Lemma 3. If the cost function is quadratic (c(e) = αe2), then in the optimal
contract it is always true that x(y1) ∈ {0, 1} for y1 ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. See the appendix.
In the one-shot interaction, the most severe punishment available to the prin-
cipal is not to pay anything to the agent. If a two-period contract can be signed,
stronger incentives can be provided. The optimal contract displays memory; i.e.,
it does not coincide with contracts that ignore the information about the rst pe-
riod outcome. As it is benecial for the principal to make use of the two-period
structure, she will introduce certain milestones (y1 = 1) that should be achieved
by the agent, whenever this is possible.
16
The ineciencies exhibited by the second-best solution are of a similar nature
as the ineciencies we encountered in the one-shot model. There are downward
16
See also Gershkov and Perry (2009), who address the value of midterm reviews for a tour-
nament designer. A paper that takes this idea to the extreme is Che and Sakovicz (2004), in
which a hold-up problem can be fully overcome in the limit if the parties monitor each other's
investment more and more frequently and can base their behavior in the negotiations on the
investment observed so far.
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distortions of the eort levels compared with the rst-best solution, and as a result
there are projects that would be installed (and continued) in a rst-best world,
but that are not pursued (or at least not continued after a rst-period failure) in
the presence of moral hazard. However, it is still impossible for an investment
opportunity to be too good to be pursued, as is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume that the principal can commit not to renegotiate. If at date
0 the principal can choose between two (otherwise identical) projects with possible
returns Rg and Rb < Rg, she will never prefer the bad project that can yield Rb
only.
Proof. See the appendix.
4 Renegotiation and the overqualication eect
After the rst period is over, the principal might want to modify the contractual
arrangements, because at that point in time she would be best o under the optimal
one-period contract as characterized in Section 2.1. In the following we assume that
the principal cannot ex ante commit not to renegotiate the contract.
17
In our com-
plete contracting framework, the principal can mimic the outcome of renegotiations
in her original contract; i.e., we can conne our attention to renegotiation-proof
contracts.
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Proposition 3. Assume that the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate.
a) If P (eSB) > I2, then the project is always continued, x(0) = x(1) = 1. The
eort levels satisfy
eFB ≥ e¯C2 (1) > e¯
C
1 > e¯
C
2 (0) = e
SB.
17
See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for extensive discussions of the assumption that rene-
gotiation cannot be ruled out. See also Wang (2000) and Zhao (2006), who study renegotiation
problems in more general frameworks.
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Note that, in particular, this means it is inconsequential how the renegotiation surplus would
be split at date 2. The principal can achieve the same outcome that would be attained if she had
all bargaining power in the renegotiation game by designing the appropriate renegotiation-proof
contract at the outset.
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b) If P (eSB) ≤ I2 , then the project is terminated whenever the rst period was
a failure, x(0) = 0, and the contract is the same as under full commitment.
Proof. See the appendix.
As we have seen in the previous section, if the project was continued under full
commitment, the principal implemented a second-period eort level smaller than
eSB when the rst period was a failure. The resulting smaller second-period rent
acted as an indirect punishment of the wealth-constrained agent for the rst-period
failure. This is no longer possible if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, because
at date 2 the principal would prefer to implement eSB in order to maximize her
second-period prot. While thus the stick is no longer available, the principal
can still make use of the carrot; i.e., she can indirectly reward rst-period eort
by implementing an eort level larger than eSB following a rst-period success.19
As a result, it is still cheaper for the principal to motivate the agent to exert rst-
period eort in the two-period model than in the one-shot benchmark model, so
that e¯C1 > e
SB
.
Just as in the full commitment regime, for suciently large investment costs I2,
the principal would be better o if she terminated the project whenever the rst-
period was a failure. However, if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, at date 2 the
principal prefers to continue the project as long as she can make a positive second-
period prot by doing so. Her threat to terminate the project after a rst-period
failure is no longer credible, unless her expected second-period prot in case of
continuation would actually be negative.
In other words, the principal would like to commit to termination following a
rst-period failure, but she cannot do so. This observation has peculiar implica-
tions with regard to the project that the principal will choose at the outset, as is
highlighted in Corollary 3 below. A new kind of ineciency occurs, which we saw
19
Note that the principal would like to reduce her promised payment t2(1, 1) after a rst-period
success has occurred (in order to implement eSB in the second period), but in this case there is
no scope for mutually benecial renegotiation. The agent would insist on the original contract,
which gives him a larger rent.
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Figure 2:
This gure shows the jump in the principal's maximal payo at
I2 = P (e
SB), where the termination contract becomes feasible. The
dashed line shows the payo with commitment.
neither in the well-known one-shot problem nor in the two-period model with full
commitment.
Corollary 2. Assume that the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate. For
I2 < P (e
SB) the principal's expected prot, denoted by Π¯C(I2, R), is decreasing in
I2. For I2 ≥ P (e
SB) it is denoted by ΠT (I2, R) and again decreasing in I2. At
I2 = P (e
SB) there is an upward jump, which is bounded from below by eSBA(eSB),
as illustrated in Figure 2.
Proof. See the appendix.
Corollary 2 says that the principal can be better o if her continuation costs I2
are increased, which may be surprising at rst sight. Yet, this result follows imme-
diately from the fact that the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation-
proof for I2 ≥ P (e
SB), while for smaller investment costs renegotiation-proofness is
a binding constraint. Hence, the principal's expected prot makes an upward jump
at I2 = P (e
SB). This eect can be so strong that she would even prefer to have
higher investment costs in both periods, or similarly, she would prefer to install a
project that can only yield a smaller revenue R.
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Corollary 3. Assume that the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate. If
at date 0 the principal can choose between two (otherwise identical) projects with
possible returns Rg and Rb < Rg, she may prefer the bad project that can yield Rb
only.
Proof. See the appendix.
For example, let c(e) = 1
2
e2, I2 = 0.12, Rb = 0.68, and Rg = 0.7. It is
straightforward to show that the principal's expected prot is Π ≈ 0. 147 if she
installs the good project that can yield Rg, while it is Π ≈ 0. 157 if she installs
the bad project that can yield Rb only (and is otherwise identical). Note that if
there is a rst-period installment cost I1 = 0.15, this even means that while the
principal would be willing to install the bad project, the good project would
never be funded.
Intuitively, pursuing a bad project that can yield a relatively small return (or,
similarly, hiring a less qualied agent who can generate only a small return or who
requires higher investments by the principal) acts as a commitment device. The
principal knows that if she chooses the more attractive alternative, then at date 2
she cannot resist the temptation to continue after a rst-period failure. For this
reason, a project can be just too good to be funded or an overqualied agent
may not be hired.
20
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Lewis and Sappington (1993) have also pointed out that employers will sometimes not hire
applicants who are overqualied, even when their salary expectations are modest. However, their
model is quite dierent from ours; they consider an adverse selection problem with countervailing
incentives due to type-dependent reservation utilities. Note that in our model a more productive
agent might not be hired even if his reservation utility is not higher than the one of a less qualied
agent. Similarly, Axelson and Bond (2010) also report a talent scorned eect in a model that is
similar to ours. However, they endogenize the agent's outside option in the model, and the result
that less qualied agents can be preferred is due to the fact that they have lower outside options.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have extended the literature on repeated moral hazard prob-
lems to cover hidden action models in which the agent is risk-neutral but wealth-
constrained. We have compared the induced eort levels across periods and states.
It has turned out that the optimal contract exhibits memory, even though the pe-
riods are technologically independent. Moreover, we have identied a novel kind of
potential ineciency that has escaped the previous literature.
The present contribution seems to be suciently simple to be used as a building
block in more applied work. As has been pointed out in the introduction, our
model shares some features with dynamic adverse selection models. It might thus
be applied in elds which previously have been studied from the perspective of
the literature on precontractual private information and soft budget constraints.
Specically, applications of our model could help to explain the funding of inferior
projects (e.g., in the context of development aid), even if the project quality is
commonly known. Our model could also be applied in the eld of corporate nance,
where moral hazard problems with risk-neutral but wealth-constrained agents are
ubiquitous (see Tirole, 2005).
It is straightforward to relax several assumptions that were made to keep the
exposition as clear as possible. For example, if it is required by an application, one
might easily generalize the model by allowing dierent cost functions and dierent
returns in the two periods. Moreover, one can dispense with the assumption that
the principal has all bargaining power. Regardless of the bargaining protocol, the
principal would only be willing to participate if her investment costs were covered.
Hence, qualitatively our main ndings would still be relevant. One could also
consider the case in which the agent's wealth or his reservation utility may be
positive. As long as the agent is not wealthy enough to buy the rm, the eects
highlighted in our model continue to be relevant.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
We dene for e > 0 a function
F (e) := S(e)− I2 −
S ′(e)A(e)
A′(e)
, (13)
which has the derivative
F ′(e) =
A(e)
A′(e)2
(−S ′′(e)A′(e) + S ′(e)A′′(e)). (14)
Recall that for eort levels e ≤ eFB, the function S is increasing and concave, and
A is positive, increasing, and strictly convex. Hence, F is strictly increasing for 0 <
e ≤ eFB. If I2 > 0, then for suciently small eort levels e it holds that S(e) < I2,
and therefore F (e) < 0, while for e = eFB it holds that F (e) = S(eFB) − I2 ≥ 0.
Hence, there exists a unique zero e¯ > 0 of F . It follows immediately that e¯ = eFB
for I2 = S(e
FB). In addition it holds that
F (e) = P (e)− I2 −
S ′(e)A(e)− A′(e)A(e)
A′(e)
= P (e)− I2 −
P ′(e)A(e)
A′(e)
. (15)
This equality also implies
P (e¯)− I2 =
P ′(e¯)A(e¯)
A′(e¯)
, (16)
which shows that e¯ = eSB if I2 = P (e
SB).
Taking the derivative with respect to I2 on both sides of equation (12) which
denes e¯ yields
∂e¯
∂I2
= −
A′2(e¯)
A(e¯)(S ′′(e¯)A′(e¯)− A′′(e¯)S ′(e¯))
> 0. (17)
Hence, e¯ is increasing in I2. For I2 = 0 it holds that lime→0 F (e) = 0, which implies
that e¯ approaches 0 as I2 → 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.
The principal solves
max
t1,e2,x
x(P (e2)− I2)− t1 (18)
s.t. t1 ≥ 0,
t1 + xA(e2) = a,
x ∈ [0, 1].
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We transform this problem by replacing t1 by a− xA(e2):
max
e2,x
x(S(e2)− I2)− a (19)
s.t. a ≥ xA(e2),
x ∈ [0, 1].
First, we consider the case a ≥ A(eFB). In this case, the required payo of the
agent is greater than the possible gross surplus S(eFB) = A(eFB) and can therefore
only be achieved with a nonnegative transfer t1 = a− A(e2). That is, the limited
liability constraint cannot be binding, and performing the maximization in (19)
without this constraint yields x = 1 and e2 = e
FB. Since at these values the limited
liability constraint is equal to a ≥ A(eFB), it follows that the limited liability
constraint is binding if and only if a ≤ A(eFB).
For the case a < A(eFB) it must therefore be true that A(e2)x = a. If a = 0 then
it is easy to see that x = 0 is optimal, with the eort level remaining unspecied.
Since for a > 0 it holds that x > 0 and A(e2) > 0, the limited liability constraint
can be transformed to x = a
A(e2)
, and the constraint x ≤ 1 becomes A(e2) ≥ a.
Hence, for the case a < A(eFB) we get the optimization problem
max
e2>0
S(e2)− I2
A(e2)
(20)
s.t. A(e2) ≥ a.
The Lagrangian for this problem is L(e2, λ) =
S(e2)−I2
A(e2)
+ λ(A(e2)− a) with λ ≥ 0.
In the optimum it holds that
S ′(e2)A(e2)
A′(e2)
− (S(e2)− I2) = −λA(e2)
2
(21)
and we have the complementary slackness condition λ > 0 ⇒ A(e2) = a. The
left-hand side of this equation vanishes at e2 = e¯, and it is shown in the proof of
Lemma 1 that it is decreasing in e2. Hence we either have that
S ′(e2)A(e2)
A′(e2)
− (S(e2)− I2) < 0 (22)
and A(e2) = a, which is true if and only if a > A(e¯), or we have that the eort
level e2 = e¯ is implemented and the payo is ne-tuned by adjusting the contin-
uation probability x = a
A(e¯)
. To summarize, the cheapest way for the principal to
implement continuation payo a is given by
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• x = 1, t1 = a−A(e
FB), e2 = e
FB
, with pi = S(eFB)− I2 − a, if a ≥ A(e
FB),
• x = 1, t1 = 0, e2 = A
−1(a), with pi = P (e2)− I2, if A(e
FB) > a > A(e¯), and
• x = a/A(e¯), t1 = 0, e2 = e¯, with pi = x(P (e2)− I2), if A(e¯) ≥ a ≥ 0.
It remains to show that the function pi is continuously dierentiable with weakly
decreasing derivative pi′(a) = P
′(e2)
A′(e2)
, which then implies concavity of pi. For a >
A(eFB) we have pi′(a) = −1 = P
′(eFB)
A′(eFB)
, and for a < A(e¯) we have pi′(a) = P
′(e¯)
A′(e¯)
.
Because pi is continuous, this includes a = 0 except for I2 = 0. Both expressions
are independent of a. For the intermediate case, A(eFB) > a > A(e¯), the derivative
is pi′(a) = P
′(e2)
A′(e2)
with e2 = A
−1(a). It has the limits −1 as a → A(eFB) and P
′(e¯)
A′(e¯)
as a → A(e¯), which due to continuity of pi is sucient for dierentiability at the
points A(e¯) and A(eFB). Moreover, on this interval we have
pi′′(a) =
P ′′(e2)A
′(e2)− P
′(e2)A
′′(e2)
A′(e2)3
=
S ′′(e2)A
′(e2)− S
′(e2)A
′′(e2)
A′(e2)3
< 0. (23)
Proof of Proposition 1.
As shown in Lemma 2, no eort level greater than eFB will be implemented, hence
e2(1) ≤ e
FB
. To show how the eort levels compare across periods and states, we
have to solve the principal's maximization problem. Recall that a(1) denotes the
agent's continuation payo in case of a success and a(0) the agent's continuation
payo in case of a failure, so that in the rst period the agent chooses an eort
level e1 = argmaxe ea(1) + (1 − e)a(0) − c(e). As described in Lemma 2, the
principal can choose any pair of nonnegative continuation payos a(0), a(1) and
get the payo e1(R+ pi(a(1))) + (1− e1)pi(a(0)). Because setting a(1) ≤ a(0) with
e1 = 0 is dominated by repeating the optimal one-period contract,
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we can omit
the constraint a(1) ≥ 0 and use the rst order condition c′(e1) = a(1) − a(0) to
characterize the incentive compatible rst-period eort level. Hence, we can state
the principal's optimization problem in terms of e1 and a(0) as
max
e1,a(0)
e1(R + pi(c
′(e1) + a(0))) + (1− e1)pi(a(0)) (24)
s.t. a(0) ≥ 0.
21
Unconditionally repeating the optimal one-period contract yields 2P (eSB)− I2, while e1 = 0
yields P (eSB)− I2 at best.
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The Lagrangian for this problem is
L(e1, a(0), λ) = e1(R + pi(c
′(e1) + a(0))) + (1− e1)pi(a(0)) + λa(0),
with λ ≥ 0. Recall that A′(e) = ec′′(e) to see that in the optimum it must hold
that
R + pi(a(1))− pi(a(0)) + A′(e1)pi
′(a(1)) = 0, (25)
and
e1pi
′(a(1)) + (1− e1)pi
′(a(0)) = −λ, (26)
with either a(0) = 0, which corresponds to the termination case in the proposition,
or a(0) > 0 and λ = 0.
We start with using the rst order conditions to show that in the optimum
e1 < e2(1). First, in the case a(1) ≤ A(e
FB
), note that
c′(e1) = a(1)− a(0) ≤ a(1) ≤ e2(1)c
′(e2(1))− c(e2(1)) < c
′(e2(1)).
Second, for the case a(1) > A(eFB) we have pi′(a(1)) = −1 and pi(a(1)) < 0 (see
Lemma 2), so that the rst order condition (25) tells us that A′(e1) < R. On the
other hand, A′(e1) = e1c
′′(e1) ≥ c
′(e1), because c
′′
is weakly increasing. Since for
any e1 ≥ e
FB
it holds that c′(e1) ≥ R, it must in fact be true that e1 < e
FB = e2(1).
Next, we show that e1 > e
SB. Using the equality a(1) − a(0) = c′(e1) we can
rewrite the rst order condition (25) as follows:
P ′(e1) = a(0) + pi(a(0))− (a(1) + pi(a(1)))− A
′(e1)(pi
′(a(1)) + 1).
Note that pi′(a(1)) ≥ −1 (see Lemma 2), and because the second period surplus
rises in the implemented agent's payo, we see that P ′(e1) ≤ 0 and hence, e1 ≥ e
SB
.
Moreover, e1 = e
SB
can only hold if a(0) = 0, a(1) + pi(a(1)) = 0, and pi′(a) = −1,
which can only be true in the boundary case I2 = S(e
FB).
It remains to be shown that, in case of continuation, e2(0) < e
SB. From Lemma 2
we know that pi′(a) = P
′(e2)
A′(e2)
is decreasing in a, hence we have that pi′(a(1)) ≤
pi′(a(0)). In the case that a(0) > 0 and λ = 0 it must be true that pi′(a(1)) and
pi′(a(0)) have opposite signs for equation (26) to be fullled. Hence, it holds that
P ′(e2(1)) < 0 < P
′(e2(0)), which implies e2(0) < e
SB < e2(1).
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Proof of Proposition 2.
First, we show that for installment costs smaller than P (eSB) it holds that x(1) = 1
in the optimal contract, while for installment costs larger than P (eSB) it holds that
x(0) = 0. To see this, note that Lemma 2 implies that if x(1) < 1 then e2(1) = e¯
and that if x(0) > 0 then e2(0) ≥ e¯. Moreover, Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 tell us
that for I2 ≤ P (e
SB) it holds that e¯ ≤ eSB < e2(1), which contradicts x(1) < 1,
while for I2 ≥ P (e
SB) it would hold that e¯ ≥ eSB > e2(0) in case x(0) > 0, which
is a contradiction.
Next, we show that there exists a threshold IC > 0 as in the proposition. To
see what happens for very low installment costs I2 → 0, recall from the proof of
Proposition 1 (equation 26), that an optimal contact must satisfy the condition
e1pi
′(a(1)) + (1 − e1)pi
′(a(0)) ≤ 0. Lemma 2 and Lemma 1 imply that if in the
optimal contract x(0) < 1 then pi′(a(0)) = P
′(e¯)
A′(e¯)
, so that pi′(a(0)) → ∞ as I2 → 0
while pi′(a(1)) ≥ −1. This shows that for suciently low levels of I2 a contract
with unconditional continuation (x(0) = x(1) = 1) is optimal.
Note that the eort levels induced by this unconditional continuation contract
do not depend on I2, which implies that the derivative of the principal's maximum
prot with respect to I2 is equal to −1 for low installment costs. In general, the
maximum prot is decreasing and weakly convex in I2. Consequently, there must
exist an investment level IC > 0 such that to always continue the project is optimal
for all I2 ≤ I
C
, but not for any I2 > I
C
.
Since we have already shown x(0) = 0 for all I2 ≥ P (e
SB), there must exist
an investment level IT with IC ≤ IT ≤P (eSB) such that a termination contract
(eT1 , e
T
2 , x
T , tT1 , t
T
2 ) with x
T (0) = 0 is optimal for all I2 > I
T . Next, consider the
(possibly empty) range of installment costs between IC and IT for which the op-
timal contract features x(0) ∈ (0, 1). Equation (26) in the proof of Proposition 1
tells us that the rst period eort level induced by this contract is
e1 =
P ′(e¯)
P ′(e¯)− pi′(a(1))A′(e¯)
. (27)
Since at I2 = P (e
SB) this condition reads e1 = 0, but e1 close to zero would
contradict e1 > e
SB
, it must hold that IT < P (eSB).
Finally, we show existence of the threshold ITT . If the agent's continuation
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payo after a success, which is equal to c′(eT1 ) in the termination contract, is smaller
than A(e¯), then the project is continued with probability xT (1) < 1 only, else it
is continued with probability xT (1) = 1 (this is again Lemma 2). As proved in
Lemma 1, the threshold e¯ is increasing in I2. Moreover, it is straightforward to
show that eT1 , which is implicitly characterized by
R + pi(c′(eT1 )) + A
′(eT1 )pi
′(c′(eT1 )) = 0,
(see equation 25, with a(0) = 0), is decreasing in I2. Consequently, there must exist
a cut-o level P (eSB) < ITT ≤ S(eFB), such that for all I2 > I
TT
it holds that
A(e¯) > c′(eT1 ) and x
T (1) < 1, and for all I2 ≤ I
TT
it holds that A(e¯) ≤ c′(eT1 ) and
xT (1) = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.
First, note that for a quadratic cost function c(e) = αe2 our assumptions imply
that 2α ≥ R. For such a cost function, it holds that eFB = R
2α
and S(eFB) = R
2
4α
,
while eSB = R
4α
and c′(eSB) = R
2
. It is thus the case that A(eFB) ≤ c′(eSB). Since
the principal's optimal contract will always lead to a rst-period eort level that
exceeds eSB, it must hold that e2(1) = e
FB
and x(1) = 1 for all possible installment
costs.
Next, assume that for some I2 there was an optimal contract with x(0) ∈ (0, 1).
Going back to equation (27) in the proof of Proposition 2 we see that this contract
would implement the rst period eort level
e1 =
P ′(e¯)
S ′(e¯)
=
P (e¯)− I2
S(e¯)− I2
, (28)
where we used pi′(a(1)) = −1 (see Lemma 2) for the rst equality, and the denition
of e¯ in equation (12) together with equation (16) for the second. Taking into account
the incentive constraint for e1, c
′(e1) = a(1)− a(0), we can rewrite the principal's
prot from such a contract as
P (e1) + e1(S(e
FB)− I2)− e1x(0)(S(e¯)− I2) + x(0)(P (e¯)− I2). (29)
Plugging in the value for e1, we see that it is equal to
P (e1) + e1(S(e
FB)− I2) ≤ max
e
P (e) + e1(S(e
FB)− I2) = Π
T (I2, R), (30)
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where ΠT (I2, R) denotes the principal's payo from a termination contract. Hence,
a contract with x(0) ∈ (0, 1) is never optimal.
Proof of Corollary 1.
Consider the optimal contract in the case of the bad project with return Rb. In the
case of the good project with return Rg > Rb the principal could simply oer the
same contract. Then the agent's behavior would be the same, but the principal's
expected prot would be strictly larger. By optimally adjusting the contract in the
case of the good project, the principal's payo can only improve.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The principal now has to take into consideration additional renegotiation-proofness
constraints. First, we present the version of the renegotiation-proofness principle
that applies here (cf. Hart and Tirole, 1988). Renegotiation-proofness is simple in
our setting due to complete contracting and the fact that renegotiation can occur
only between the two periods.
22
In particular, we do not need backward induction
to dene the set of renegotiation-proof contracts. Because the arguments are well
known, we only sketch them here.
If there is a contract κ = (e1, e2, x, t1, t2) ∈ C in place, then at date 2, when the
outcome y1 is realized, this contract would lead to a continuation payo
a(y1) = t1(y1) + x(y1) (e2(y1)c
′(e2(y))− c(e2(y1)))
for the agent and a continuation payo
p(y1) = −t1(y1) + x(y1) (e2(y1)(R− c
′(e2(y))))
for the principal. We could assume any renegotiation process that is described by
a function that maps the current pair of continuation payo a(y1), p(y1) to a pair
of expected payos aRP (y1), p
RP (y1) such that a
RP (y1) ≥ a(y1), p
RP (y1) ≥ p(y1),
22
The only other points in time when new information arrives are at date 4, when y2 realizes and
only payments remain to be made, and when the continuation decision realizes. Note, however,
that if an expected payo (xa, xp) is Pareto-optimal, then the realized termination payos (0, 0)
or continuation payos (a, p) are Pareto-optimal as well.
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and the pair aRP (y1), p
RP (y1) is Pareto-optimal in the set of attainable continua-
tion payos. As an example for such a process, one can imagine that the agent
(resp., the principal) makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer of a new continuation con-
tract (e′2, x
′, t′1, t
′
2,) with probability α (resp, 1−α), and the other party accepts or
rejects. Clearly, the contract κ = (e1, e2, t1, t2, x) is renegotiation-proof if and only
if it already species a Pareto-optimal second-period outcome for both y1 ∈ {0, 1}.
If the contract κ is not renegotiation-proof, it will not lead to the specied eort
levels. Instead, second period outcomes are determined by renegotiation, which
is anticipated by the agent when he chooses the rst-period eort level such that
c′(eRP1 ) = a
RP (1)− aRP (0). The principal's payo if the contract κ is written and
renegotiated thus is
ΠRP (κ) = eRP1 (R + p
RP (1)) + (1− eRP1 )p
RP (0). (31)
Let C denote the set of all possible contracts as dened in Section 2.2 and let
CRP denote the set of renegotiation-proof contracts. Furthermore, Π(κ) denotes
the principal's payo if she can commit to the contract κ, and ΠRP (κ) denotes the
principal's payo from a contract κ if there is renegotiation. The version of the
renegotiation-proofness principle that applies in our framework says that
max
κ∈C
ΠRP (κ) = max
κ∈CRP
Π(κ). (32)
It follows by denition of renegotiation-proof contracts that ΠRP (κ) = Π(κ) for all
κ ∈ CRP , and therefore maxκ∈C Π
RP (κ) ≥ maxκ∈CRP Π(κ). The other direction fol-
lows because with complete contracts any Pareto-optimal allocation can be reached
by a contract in C.23 With renegotiation every contract κ ∈ C leads to Pareto-
optimal continuation payos aRP (y1), p
RP (y1), and a contract κ
′
that species the
continuation payos a′(y1) = a
RP (y1) and p
′(y1) = p
RP (y1) from the outset is then
renegotiation-proof with ΠRP (κ) = Π(κ′).
23
By working directly with the set C, we use the same initial simplications to the set of
contracts as in the full commitment case. The reason why we can do this is that all that matters
for renegotiation are the continuation payos of the two parties, and the simplications that
were made to the set of contracts have the property that all possible continuation payos stay
attainable with the reduced set of contracts.
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Pareto optimal one-period outcomes can be found by maximizing the principal's
payo under the constraint that the agent gets at least a certain payo, a problem
that we already partially solved with Lemma 2. The Pareto frontier must consist of
pairs (a, pi(a)) of the form described in the lemma, but not all of these payos are
indeed Pareto-optimal. The function pi is increasing as long as e2 ≤ e
SB
, and then
decreasing. Consequently, all pairs (a, pi(a)) with e2 ≥ e
SB
are Pareto-optimal,
while all pairs with e2 < e
SB
are Pareto-dominated.
Consider rst the case I2 < P (e
SB). In this case, e¯ ≤ eSB, and therefore of
all continuation contracts described in Lemma 2 only those with a ≥ A(eSB) are
renegotiation-proof. The principal solves
max
a(1),a(0)
e1 (R + pi(a(1))) + (1− e1)pi(a(0)), (33)
subject to a(0) ≥ A(eSB), and where e1 is given by c
′(e1) = a(1)− a(0).
This is solved by a(0) = A(eSB) and e¯C2 (0) = e
SB
as well as e¯C1 , e¯
C
2 (1) implicitly
dened by c′(e¯C1 ) = a(1)− A(e
SB) and
R + pi(a(1))− pi(A(eSB)) + A′(e¯C1 )pi
′(a(1)) = 0.
The comparison of eort levels follows as before. We denote the principal's expected
prot in the case of unconditional continuation by
Π¯C(I2, R) = P (e¯
C
1 ) + e¯
C
1
[
S(e¯C2 (1))− S(e
SB)
]
+ P (eSB)− I2. (34)
To get this expression for the prot we used that a(1) − c′(e¯C1 ) − A(e
SB) = 0 and
that with unconditional continuation a(y1) + pi(a(y1)) = S(e2(y1))− I2.
Consider next the case I2 ≥ P (e
SB). In this case, e¯ ≥ eSB, so that all continu-
ation payos described in Lemma 2 are Pareto-optimal.
Since then I2 > I
T
, the termination contract characterized in the proof of
Proposition 2 solves the principal's maximization problem. This contract is renegotiation-
proof. The principal's prot in case of termination is
ΠT (I2, R) = P (e
T
1 ) + e
T
1 x
T (1)(S(eT2 (1))− I2).
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Proof of Corollary 2.
Let Π¯C(I2, R) and Π
T (I2, R) be the prot from a renegotiation-proof continuation
contract and from a termination contract, resp., as dened in the proof of Propo-
sition 3. The functions Π¯C(I2, R) and Π
T (I2, R) are continuous and decreasing in
I2 (with derivatives −1 and −e
T
1 , resp.). At I2 = P (e
SB) > IT , we know that
ΠT (I2, R) > Π¯
C(I2, R). Hence, at I2 = P (e
SB) the principal's expected prot as
characterized in Proposition 3 is discontinuous, and the size of the jump is given
by
ΠT (P (eSB), R)− Π¯C(P (eSB), R)
= P (eT1 ) + e
T
1
[
S(eT2 (1))− P (e
SB)
]
−
(
P (e¯C1 ) + e¯
C
1
[
S(e¯C2 (1))− S(e
SB)
])
> P (e¯C1 ) + e¯
C
1
[
S(e¯C2 (1))− P (e
SB)
]
−
(
P (e¯C1 ) + e¯
C
1
[
S(e¯C2 (1))− S(e
SB)
])
> eSBA(eSB).
Proof of Corollary 3.
Fix R and I2 = P (e
SB). Because P (eSB) is increasing in R, Proposition 3 implies
that any Rb < R leads to the expected prot Π
T (I2, Rb), while any Rg > R leads
to the expected prot Π¯C(I2, Rg). Corollary 2 shows that Π
T (I2, R) > Π¯
C(I2, R)+
eSBA(eSB). Since ΠT (I2, R) and Π¯
C(I2, R) are continuous in R, one can nd an Rg
slightly larger than R and an Rb slightly smaller than R, such that Π
T (I2, Rb) >
Π¯C(I2, Rg), i.e., the principal prefers Rb to Rg.
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